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Abstract
Contrà Dale Jamieson, the study of the metaethical foundations of
environmental ethics may well lead students to a more environmentally
responsible way of life. For although metaethics is rarely decisive in decision
making and action, there are two kinds of circumstances in which it can play a
crucial role in our practical decisions. First, decisions that have unusual
features do not summon habitual ethical reactions, and hence invite the
application of ethical precepts that the study of metaethics and ethical theory
isolate and clarify. Second, there are times in which the good of others
(including organisms and systems in the natural world) may well be given
greater weight in one’s ethical deliberations if theory has made clear that the
good to be promoted is ontologically independent of one’s own good.

Keywords: Environmental ethics, environmental education, environmental
value, metaethics, Dale Jamieson

Introduction
Classes in environmental ethics are increasingly common at the
college level. Often, these classes focus on the question of the
metaphysical status of the value or goodness to be ascribed to entities
and systems in the natural world.2 Is value inherent in Nature? Does it
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originate and exist in the mind of the one who recognizes the value?
Are there other possibilities?
Here I would like to discuss the role that such questions play in
environmental education. The study of environmental philosophy is
meant to stimulate critical reflection on the relationship between
human beings and the natural environment. We may well think that
this reflection will lead to better attitudes and actions in regard to the
environment. Is this a reasonable belief? More specifically, does
exploring philosophical questions concerning the source and
ontological basis of value contribute to what many take to be the
central task of classes in environmental ethics: cultivating the
attitudes that lead to appropriate action in regard to the natural
world?3
An ethical theory clarifies the good to be promoted and
identifies what a moral agent is obligated to do in the pursuit of this
good. A metaethics grounds and justifies this ethical theory on the
basis of an account of rationality, human nature and the larger world
of which it is a part. A metaethics often employs a metaphysics, which
discusses the underlying structures and realities that are responsible
for the obligations that the ethical theory presents. But despite the fact
that many Western ethical theories are grounded in metaphysical
theory, the thesis that metaphysics can or should make a difference in
the morality of our action is by no means uncontroversial. Dale
Jamieson in particular has argued against this.4 I think that he is right
to deemphasize the importance that metaphysical metaethics plays in
people’s actual decisions and ways of life. I do however think that
there are important exceptions to Jamieson’s view, and that one of
these is environmental ethics, an area in which Jamieson has
specialized.
The question of the metaphysical basis of value has had an
important role to play in the emerging field of environmental ethics.
Much ink has been spilt trying to show that natural things and systems
have value in and of themselves, not to be understood as a means to
the actualization of some other good, and not to be taken as always
derived from a mental or emotional attitude that people take towards
them, in order to show that there is a moral obligation to preserve
them, regardless of whether they contribute to human interests.5
Given the philosophical temper of our times, such speculation is wont
to seem metaphysically extravagant, out of sync with the hard
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sciences and smacking of mysticism. One might think “if
environmental ethics rests on such dubious foundations, so much the
worse for environmental ethics.” This is why Jamieson, with his special
interest in the field, takes it upon himself to argue that environmental
ethicists can be spending their time more productively than by arguing
over metaphysics. I argue here that there are special features to the
field of environmental ethics that give special importance to theorizing
concerning the conceptual and ontological underpinnings of ethics. One
need not explicitly engage in metaethics or metaphysics in order to
have a worthy ethical attitude towards the natural world. But in this
area, at any rate, such speculation has the potential for making a
decisive difference in our praxis.

Metaphysics and Ethics
Metaphysics and ethics have long been intertwined. Ethical
theory often explicitly rests on a metaphysical foundation, and the
data of ethics are among the givens that form the raw material of
metaphysical analysis. But to what extent is metaphysics involved in
ethical deliberation and action? It seems that it has an important role
to play only insofar as it has an essential role in ethical theory, and
insofar as ethical theory plays an essential role in ethical judgment and
decision making. But must one engage in ethical theory in order to act
ethically? Perhaps only Plato, the Stoics and Kant set the bar so high.
It is well known how Plato makes philosophy necessary for right
action. From the earlier dialogues to the Republic, Socrates insists that
one must have a special knowledge of the good, in order to achieve
what is good. For the Stoics, right action is possible only for the sage,
whose mind penetrates the underlying logos of the cosmos. For this
reason, Stoics were forced to admit that almost all, if not all, human
beings were fools and acted accordingly. Kant, on the other hand, was
more optimistic concerning the abilities of unschooled everyday
reason. For Kant, ethical action is rational action, and necessarily
involves an application of the Categorical Imperative, but this is not an
application of theory and does not require of the agent any excursion
into metaethics. Other Western ethical philosophical traditions also
seem less committed to the role played by ethical theory and its
metaphysical foundation as prerequisites for ethical action. To be sure,
Aristotle tells us that a theoretical account of the human good gives us
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a target at which to aim (NE I.2), but this may be a glance at either
the political implications of the ethics (since a leader needs to clearly
see the telos of the community) or Book 10’s encouragement of the
contemplative life, neither a fundamental part of the everyday morality
of the private citizen. Rather, for most people the moral life comes
through the ethical habituation that results from obeying the law and
following the example of the phronimos, the person of practical
wisdom. This is similarly the case in Natural Law theory, whose
underlying metaphysics is more involved and has a more explicit role
to play in ethical theory than that of Aristotle’s ethics from which it is
largely derived. Finally, ethical theories such as that of Hume or
classical utilitarianism which ground ethics on human sentiment hold
that the study of ethical theory may refine our sentiments and render
them consistent with each other, but cannot serve to instill the core
sentiments of fellow-feeling that underlie morality. Such theories often
explicitly dispense with metaphysical speculation, since the core moral
sentiments are taken as empirically given and not to be justified by
any more basic account.
For this reason, it appears that Jamieson is battling something
of a straw man; to dissuade us from overemphasizing the issue of the
metaphysical foundations of value in nature, he writes that ethical
realists understand metaethics “as some immaculate conception that
sits in judgment of our practices” or “part of a reforming philosophical
project . . . philosophy run amok.”6 Jamieson tells us that “philosophy,
understood as the appreciation of, and reflection on, our practices,
leaves the world alone. It may inform and incline our thoughts, but it
cannot determine them.”7 Platonists, Cynics, and Stoics aside, no
major figure in the Western philosophical tradition has thought
otherwise (except insofar as the activity of philosophy itself is taken to
be constitutive of the good life). Engaging in metaethics or
metaphysics has rarely been taken to be required for living in a decent
manner. More particularly, it would be astonishing to claim that a class
in environmental ethics is a prerequisite for the cultivation of
ecologically responsible habits.
However, even if one can act perfectly morally without expertise
in metaphysics, I can imagine three kinds of cases in which people’s
actions can be affected by virtue of engaging in ethical theory and
metaethics. These are worth mentioning, even though in the first two
kinds of cases it is not philosophical thought as such that is decisive,
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and hence these do not dislodge Jamieson’s point concerning the
impracticality of theories concerning the ontology of value.
(1) If we antecedently assume that consistency is a good for
which we should strive, ethical theory is useful in making sure that our
judgments are consistent. We may give up or alter an ethical
judgment when we see that it is inconsistent with other judgments or
beliefs to which we are committed. This is the stuff of Socratic
elenchus, and at their best we see this sort of thing in our introductory
ethics classes. Students who are committed to certain ethical
principles can be led to see that they implicitly clash with certain
judgments they make. This can lead people to revise these judgments
and to make different choices. But typically in such a case the students
come to isolate and apply foundational ethical precepts, and to identify
certain goods and duties at a general level. Discussion need not
extend to the level of metaphysical analysis, explaining what it is
about the world that makes these goods desirable and gives these
duties their binding character.
For example, one might be led to see that the right to life
entails a right to a modicum of health care, and one’s political
allegiances could conceivably change as a result of such an argument.
But how would this depend on a metaphysical account of human
nature that explains what it is about human beings that gives them a
right to life? Similarly, students who already take cruelty to animals to
be a moral evil can be shown that certain practices in factory farming,
or even purchasing food that derives from such practices, is
inconsistent with their initial assumptions. Those who already value
biodiversity can be shown that this ethical commitment is incompatible
with the typical American lifestyle. But such reflection does not rest on
investigating the theoretical foundations of value. To show consistency
or inconsistency in a set of views does not depend on any particular
theoretical grounding of ethics—all that is required is an account of
principles and basic precepts, and the ability to think logically.
(2) An ethical theory may have certain pragmatic value that is
to a certain extent independent of its philosophical value. It was Plato,
in the Laws, who first suggested that philosophy is not only for
philosophers—the very fact that an already respected authority
presents a logos (argument) in support of a rule makes a citizen more
inclined to follow and uphold that rule, even though he or she is not
capable of fully understanding that argument.8 In this way, a priest
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might argue for a certain moral view on the basis of Natural Law
theory. The argument may be only half-understood by his
congregants, but the very fact that the argument is there may give the
position greater weight than it would have had only on the basis of the
priest’s personal or ecclesiastical authority. Similarly, the Talmud rests
on a metaphysics (not all of which can be supported on strictly
philosophical grounds). As an observant Jew, my study of Talmud can
motivate me in adhering to Jewish law with greater diligence than
I would simply on the basis of rabbinical authority unsupported by
argument. This is so in spite of the rudimentary nature of my
understanding of Talmudic reasoning. This is because arguing for a
conclusion is a powerful rhetorical device for persuading others of that
conclusion. The fuller the argument (that is, the greater the extent
that it is based only on agreed-upon premises), and the more it is
adequately understood, the more convincing the argument is. This is
so, even if, as is always (or nearly always) the case, the argument is
not fully grasped, from its foundations through its intervening steps.
If I understand Jamieson correctly, it is here that one finds
metaethics to have some pragmatic value. Ontological claims are
made in order to provide foundations and fill in the gaps found in
ethical argumentation. An argument containing as an unsupported
premise the claim that others ought to value some entity or state of
affairs is less full than one that grounds this premise in some general
ontology. In so arguing, we speak in a way that reifies our act of
valuing and presents the value found as something independent of
that act, and accordingly as something to be considered in everyone’s
ethical deliberations, regardless of perspective or interests. We do this
as a rhetorical ploy, to get others to act as we would like them to, for
we are suggesting that the value is “out there,” available for them too
to recognize, if only they would see. An ethical theory, which pretends
to take this value as its object and study it apart from the
psychological and social conditions of the acts of valuing that give rise
to it, is part of this same rhetorical enterprise.9 Thus, Jamieson writes:
“In everyday life, we commit acts of metaethics when reflective
thought, unreflective argument, or the simple pressure of serious
disagreement takes us to the brink of a rhetorical abyss. At such
moments we employ metaethical strategies in the service of our
practical ends.”10 It cannot be denied that discussion of the
metaphysical bases of ethical theory can play this role, sometimes
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effectively. In cases of this kind, too, it is not the metaphysics behind
the theory that gives it its practical import, except insofar as those
argument fragments that are comprehended make the whole account
more persuasive. In this way, a student might only half-understand
the arguments behind the land ethic, but the air of authority and the
persuasive manner of a teacher of environmental ethics who lays out
the theoretical foundations of the land ethic may predispose the
student to accept it, and the parts of the argument that the student
does understand may be decisive in her coming to say to herself
“Makes sense to me.” She may come to call herself an adherent of the
land ethic, something that might never have happened had she not sat
through lectures and discussions covering material she inadequately
grasps. This may well be decisive in later leading the student to avoid
applying pesticides on her lawn, and so forth.
(3) I should not omit to mention the kind of thing that we see in
Plato’s dialogues, and that hopefully goes on in our classes, including
those in environmental ethics. Through leading students to engage in
the activity of philosophical reflection (including metaethical reflection)
students can learn for themselves that this activity is intrinsically
valuable, and it may come to form part of their conception of the good
life. This may indeed lead to some practical decisions: from the
decision to join a philosophy reading group to devoting one’s life to
metaphysics. But, on the face of it, this does not seem different from
the practical implications of being introduced to fine French cuisine. To
show otherwise requires the sort of theoretical argumentation whose
practical value is at issue.
(4) There is one more kind of case in which a metaphysical
metaethics can conceivably lead to the making of new and more
enlightened decisions. I suspect that it is this sort of case that both the
champions and detractors of the practicality of metaphysical
metaethics have in mind in their disputes. One may accept an ethical
theory, with all of its metaphysical framework, on the merits of
supporting arguments, which are indeed adequately understood. Then
one may come to make certain ethical judgments on account of the
fact that this theory demands it. The theory itself may be responsible
for ethical choices. Thus an argument based on an ethical theory may
lead to an unanticipated conclusion—it is at least imaginable that a
slaveowner may have seen the error of his ways as a result of reading
Kant closely and carefully. Further, when ethical obligations come in
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conflict, a theory can help prioritize ethical demands. An example
might be an intricate argument applying the Thomistic doctrine of
double effect to an ethical dilemma. It is my contention that this
happens rarely, with important exceptions. One exception is the area
of environmental ethics.
I do not here set for myself the task of proving the negative
claim, concerning the rarity of case number 4. Nietzscheans and other
antitheorists are better able to do this than I am. Besides, as I have
mentioned, few such cases are attested within the Western
philosophical tradition. Here I aim to argue that the area of
environmental ethics has distinctive characteristics, so that the sort of
metaphysical reflection that is invited by ethical thought experiments
may be decisive in the formulation of new ethical judgments.

Metaphysical Reflection and Environmental Ethics
I begin with a thought experiment that has become something
of a chestnut in the area of environmental ethics. I lay it out not in
order to adequately evaluate whether it is successful in isolating a
“metaphysical intuition” concerning the value of the natural world (I
think it is) but in order to explore its purported role as foundational to
an environmental ethics that makes a real difference in practice.
The thought experiment I would like to consider was formulated
by Richard Routley at the dawn of environmental philosophy as such.11
Imagine a last man, who takes it in his head to destroy the living
things and ecosystems that would otherwise survive him. Our
immediate unreflective response would be to say that there would be
something very wrong about this. Thus, Routley argues, our thought
experiment shows that nonhuman beings have inherent value. There is
a goodness to them that is not dependent on the thought processes of
an evaluator; for, in the situation under consideration, the evaluator is
absent from the scene. Routley argued that, insofar as traditional
Western ethics is not able to account for this value, it is deficient, and
ethics needs a new foundation. Thus environmental ethics as a
distinctive discipline is born.
There are various ways of countering Routley’s claim, and
various ways in which it can be defended, some of which Routley
himself offered to critics both potential and actual. I have much to say
on this, which I hope to soon offer the community of environmental
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ethicists. But I here avoid such ontological speculation, since my
present task is to wonder what effect such exploration has on actual
conduct. More specifically, what effect could a college philosophy class
in which such metaphysical argumentation plays a dominant role have
on the actual behavior of students taking it? Could it conceivably lead
to a more environmentally responsible life, after the examinations and
paper assignments are long forgotten?
Suppose that someone finds Routley’s argument philosophically
convincing. What has happened? A thought experiment shows that
certain things are good independent of human valuation and hence
shows the inadequacy of a metaethics that denies this. Accordingly, an
alternative ethical theory is required, which gives some ontological
status to such goodness. This theory both posits value outside of the
human realm (a move with which Jamieson and Callicott have no
objection) and takes the source of that value to lie outside of the
human realm (which these two authors deny). Hence, one adopts the
new ethical theory and its metaphysical commitments because it has
greater explanatory power than its rivals.
The metaphysical speculation at issue is not a prerequisite for
finding noninstrumental value in nature. Rather, the thought
experiment is prior to such speculation, and shows that we do find
such value in nature, regardless of any metaphysical thought or
theorizing concerning the source of this value. In everyday life, we
may well have made decisions to preserve such value, whether
through practicing organic gardening, keeping on the trails to prevent
erosion, or giving money or time to an environmental cause. But such
decisions could well have been made in the interests of human beings:
who is clear about his motives? The thought experiment is meant to
provide some clarity here, by postulating a case in which the decision
cannot be made for the sake of people who take an actual interest in
the bearers of goodness, since by hypothesis there are no people to
take such an interest. Yes, this is an extreme case, of a sort that
people will not encounter in their day to day decision making, the sort
of science fiction example to which teachers of introductory ethics too
often resort. But these cases have their use: they provide what the
real world does not, ways of imaginatively abstracting decisions from
surrounding circumstances. If one is trying to prove that a certain
factor X is (or can be) decisive in ethical decision-making, one strains
to set up an example where another factor Y, which is often taken to
Worldviews, Vol 8, No. 2-3 (June 2004): pg. 185-197. DOI. This article is © Brill Academic Publishers and permission has
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Brill Academic Publishers does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Brill
Academic Publishers.

9

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

be decisive, cannot be not operative. (For example, in our introductory
ethics classes we set up implausible examples where using another as
a mere means, through the infliction of pain, would without question
be for the greatest good for the greatest number, an evaluation always
questionable in the real world, in order to prove the Kantian principle
that one ought not use another rational being merely as a means.)
Here, a principle to be demonstrated is that natural beings have value
or worth that is not dependent or derivative on the activity of valuing,
and this is done by setting up the example in such a way that the
possibility of an evaluator is excluded. To be sure, even if one accepts
the results of the thought experiment, the theory that one is
committed to is somewhat minimal. All that has been shown is that
there is value in the natural world that is not dependent on the activity
of valuing. It is left to further theorizing to say what the bearer of this
value is (individual organism? ecosystems?), and what it is about the
world that is responsible for it. The nature of value is unclear, and
nothing is revealed concerning its relation to naturalistic properties.
Similarly nothing is said about our epistemological access to them.
Still, the existence of such value is an ontological claim, one that is
quite explicitly a piece of metaphysics. Admittedly, the thought
experiment raises a swarm of further metaphysical and
epistemological problems, but metaphysical accounts need to start
somewhere, and the existence of value that is neither anthropocentric
nor anthropogenic, indicated by the kind of thought experiment that
Routley explores, is at least a possible metaphysical principle.
I claim that in this case, when a new ethical theory is in place,
with the metaethical commitment to value in nature ontologically
independent of human valuation, judgments will be made that would
otherwise not have been made. This has a real effect in regard to our
personal decisions and public policy decisions. Consider for example
public policy debates concerning wilderness preservation. It is true
that one does not need a metaphysical account of value as inherent in
natural systems and the living things within them, in order to see that
wilderness preservation can be a good thing. One may find pleasure in
the knowledge that a bit of wilderness exists, apart from any
theorizing. Wilderness can be valued on instrumental grounds: it is
good for the psychological wellbeing of a country’s citizens, it provides
an irreplaceable kind of pleasure that would rank high on the kind of
qualitative scale we see in Mill, it preserves species that may have
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unanticipated uses, it is good for clean air, clean water, and so forth.
But on such an account the question of how much wilderness to
preserve quickly becomes one of balancing these goods with other
goods whose value arises from human thought and desire. To be sure,
such prudential balancing would be required even if we were to
recognize value that things in the natural world have in themselves,
regardless of whether or not their worth is recognized or recognizable
by evaluators. But in those cases in which we know that there are few
people with enough awareness to enable us to say that they truly
value what is at issue (for example, vast stretches of the Arctic
National Wildlife Reserve, which for most people exist only as blank
areas on a map) citizens may well make different decisions, by virtue
of their new explicitly theoretical commitments. The matter at hand
may call to mind the principle that wilderness has value, and that it
follows that public policy must take account of this. The situation
stands in contrast to a public policy matter that concerns human
beings alone. There we are on more familiar ethical ground. Our
desires to clothe the poor and feed the hungry are familiar responses
to certain kinds of situations, as are our desires to inculcate selfreliance and practice fiscal responsibility. How to balance competing
ethical demands is a matter of prudential judgment. But an explicit
ethical theory, with all of its metaphysical underpinning, will rarely be
the occasion for the judgments made here. This is because the
situations are not so unusual or unfamiliar as to immediately call to
mind the ethical theorizing to which one has been exposed, in however
fragmentary a form.
A similar sort of example is that which concerns citizens and
policymakers in the areas of food and reproductive technologies.
Ought crops to be genetically modified? To be sure, such cases lend
themselves to standard consequentialist analyses. Is the food safe?
What will happen as the variety of seed stock is diminished? But some
who consider the prospect of a tomato with the genes of a pig, say,
may initially experience revulsion, and this may occasion the
realization that living things belong to kinds with an integrity that has
noninstrumental value. To be sure, revulsion is notoriously unreliable
as a moral guide. More often than not it arises from prejudice and
superstition, rather than a sensitive moral compass. Again, my
question is not whether a line of metaphysical metaethical thinking is
sound, but whether it can have a real role to play in our practical
Worldviews, Vol 8, No. 2-3 (June 2004): pg. 185-197. DOI. This article is © Brill Academic Publishers and permission has
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Brill Academic Publishers does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Brill
Academic Publishers.

11

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

decisions. It seems clear to me that the sort of revulsion that many
have in considering the prospect of so-called “Frankenfoods” can be
the occasion for explicitly metaphysical thinking concerning the value
of biological species, and how this is to be understood from an
ecological perspective. One is led to reflect on whether we ascribe
goodness to individuals that belong to certain kinds, or to the kind
itself, or the ecosystem in which it plays a role, given some ontological
standing. This kind of metaphysical thinking can be decisive in one’s
rejection of less dramatic forms of genetic alteration in agriculture.
Were one to start by considering the issue of the ethical permissibility
of altering a crop to make it less susceptible to drought, one would
probably find it permissible. It is the imaginative thought experiment
of the unusual case that focuses attention on the metaphysical thesis
concerning the value of biological kinds, and such attention leads to a
moral precept that is adopted and employed in all cases that one takes
to be applicable.12
Now in this case an anti-metaphysical “out” is available: one
could always say in response to the revulsion occasioned by certain
products of genetic engineering or other reproductive technologies that
all that our feelings show is that we do not like these things.13
Accordingly, one could argue that the disvalue or evil that we think is
present is merely a matter of our own distress. Routley sets up his
thought experiment to try to render such a suggestion inapplicable.
Again, whether he does so successfully is controversial, and it is not
my present task to defend him here. I merely want to maintain the
practical value of his work. The metaphysical implications of Routley’s
ethical thought experiment are clearer than those that rest on
imaginative explorations of monstrosities brought about by genetic
engineering. Even those who share a moral revulsion at the prospects
of various forms of genetically engineered organisms are in principle
able to account for them as their feelings, worthy of moral
consideration only as feelings among other feelings, and hence such as
can be counterbalanced by the preferences of others. But if an
argument effectively concludes that living things and the natural
systems of which they form a part have intrinsic value that is not
ontologically dependent on the valuer, one who follows that argument
is less likely to take this value to be outweighed by the preferences of
others.
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Conclusion
I conclude that although the sort of metaphysical accounts that
underlie ethical theorizing are rarely decisive in decision-making and
action, there are two kinds of circumstances in which such accounts
can play a crucial role in practical decisions. First are those decisions
that have unusual features that do not summon habitual ethical
reactions and hence invite the application of theoretical ethical
precepts that the study of metaethics and ethical theory isolate and
clarify. Second, there are times in which the good of others (including
organisms and systems in the natural world) is not to be analyzed as
one’s own good. In such a case, this good may well be given greater
weight in one’s ethical deliberations. This is why, contra Jamieson,
students who study the purported ontological foundations of
environmental ethics may well come to live in a more environmentally
responsible manner. Metaphysics is not a perquisite for the recognition
of ethical obligations to the natural world for its own sake. But it can
help.
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Notes
1. Acknowledgments: I am grateful for the incisive comments of Dale
Jamieson and an anonymous referee, and to Arun Iyer for editorial
help.
2. See the Environmental Ethics Syllabus Project at
http://appliedphilosophy.mtsu.edu/ISEE/
3. My focus here is whether individual reflection, of the sort encouraged by
classes in philosophical ethics, has an effect on individual conduct. This
question is different from (though related to) the question of the
extent to which a society’s general philosophical or cultural outlook
determines or influences the actions of members of that society. Yi-Fu
Tuan has expressed scepticism on the latter issue, see Tuan 1971.
4. I focus on Jamieson 2002: 225-43.
5. For the debates on this issue, see for example Rolston 1989, Callicott 1985
and the papers collected in The Monist 1992, Vol. 75, No. 2: The
Intrinsic Value of Nature.
6. Ibid.: 232.
7. Ibid.: 243.
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8. At Laws 721e-723d, the Athenian Stranger argues that laws ought to be
prefaced by preludes which give the reasoning behind the law, so as to
better persuade the citizens that they are to be obeyed. The preludes
are to be written even though they may delve into abstruse
metaphysics (as is the case for the long theological prelude of Laws
10) and, as the Stranger recognizes, most of the citizenry will be
unable to fully understand the reasoning they present (722b). On this,
see Bobonich 1999.
9. Jamieson 2002: 235-6.
10. Ibid.: 232
11. Routley and Routley 1980.
12. Cf. the “heuristics of fear” discussed in Jonas 1984.
13. Such an identification of nonhuman bearers of value, which falls short of
moral realism, may well have some impact on moral judgment but, I
am arguing, when it is given some ontological grounding it is afforded
significant protection against being outweighed by the moral
consideration of human desires.
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